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While internal political transformation in Turkey has led to a deterioration of its 
relations with the EU, the European Union has been confronting its own challenges 
including the British referendum to leave the EU, as well as rising populism and 
Euroskepticism in multiple EU member states. As a result, the interplay between 
the loss of the European anchor in Turkey for political reforms, Turkey’s domestic 
political struggles, and new questions over the future of European integration have 
increased uncertainty over Turkey’s future in the Union. This article looks into 
this complex relationship from a functional cooperation angle and proposes that 
while accession might no longer be a credible option for Turkey’s future with the 
EU, alternative forms of integration have become possible, which can lead to a 
remolding of this critical relationship.
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he political landscape in Turkey drastically changed on 15 July 2016 
with the shock of an attempted military takeover. A direct casualty of 
this attempt was Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Even 
though Turkey’s relations with the EU had suffered from political set-
backs in the past, in the post-July 2016 period they reached a nadir. The European 
Parliament responded to this new state of political affairs by adopting two differ-
ent resolutions on Turkey in November 2016 and July 2017, the latest of which 
called “to formally suspend the accession negotiations with Turkey without delay 
if the constitutional reform package is implemented unchanged.”1 The Commission 
President Jean Claude Juncker summarized the EU’s official position in September 
2017 as follows: “Rule of law, justice, and fundamental values have top priority [in 
the accession process] and that rules out EU membership for Turkey in the foresee-
able future.”2 There is also a similar level of discontent with the current state of pol-
itics in Turkey among other EU member states. Similarly, the Turkish government 
is also disillusioned with the EU. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reflected on this 
disillusionment by claiming that Turkey “bent over backward to fulfill requirements 
on democratic reforms, but had been met with undelivered promises and accusa-
tions, this is not an acceptable situation.”3 Since 2016, while the internal political 
transformation in Turkey has led to a deterioration of its relations with the EU, the 
European Union has been confronting its own challenges with the British referen-
dum to leave the EU, as well as rising populism and Euroskepticism in multiple 
EU member states. As a result, the interplay of the loss of the European anchor on 
Turkey for political reforms, Turkey’s domestic political struggles, and questions 
over the future of European integration have increased the uncertainty over Turkey’s 
future in the EU. 
It was not always like this. When the accession negotiations were opened for Turkey 
in 2005, the political landscape in Turkey and the EU looked promising, pending 
that both sides stayed on course. Turkey’s accession, while difficult, seemed likely.4 
Turkey has been associated with the EU for a long time, since the Ankara Treaty of 
1963, and remains, at least on paper, part and parcel of the EU enlargement process.5 
Given the sheer size of its economy as the sixth largest economy in Europe and its 
geographic location, Turkey remains a significant partner for the EU irrespective 
1 “Turkey: MEPs raise the alarm on EU accession talks,” European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/
en/press-room/20170629IPR78637/turkey-meps-raise-the-alarm-on-eu-accession-talks, 6 July 2017
2 “Juncker: Turkey’s EU membership out of question for now,” EUobserver, https://euobserver.com/tickers/138999, 13 
September 2017.
3 Laura Pitel, “Erdoğan dares Brussels to kill Accession Talks,” Financial Times, 6 September 2017, https://www.
ft.com/content/1285e646-930a-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0
4 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the EU’s Internal Dynamics,” 
International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 1 (May 2008), pp. 208-226.
5 Ziya Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-
Helsinki era,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2003), pp. 9-35.
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of its accession.6 Now, in contrast, the effective freeze in Turkey’s accession pro-
cess—wherein no new chapters have been opened since 2016—indicates that de-
spite Turkish willingness on paper to accede to the EU, its future as an EU member 
is not promising.7 This brings forth the following questions: If Turkey’s accession to 
the EU in the near future is unlikely, does this signify the end of Turkey’s integration 
into the EU? Or, alternatively, is it possible to conceptualize Turkey’s relations with 
the EU from a different theoretical framework where formal accession might no 
longer be the only game in town?
“Even though Turkey’s relations with the EU had suffered from 
political setbacks, in the post-July 2016 period they reached a nadir.”
Such an alternative scenario is easier to elaborate upon an abstract level than de-
scribe in a concrete manner. It also brings forth echoes of a “privileged partner-
ship” that the German Chancellor Angela Merkel once contemplated and which the 
Turkish government vehemently opposed. This is why it is important to conceptual-
ize multiple policy areas and layers that would anchor Turkey to EU institutions and 
policies. One possible mode for such conceptualization could take the form of exter-
nal differentiated integration.8 While differentiated integration is essentially used to 
assess the nature and pace of integration among EU members,9 it is possible to eval-
uate the EU’s external relations with its neighbors and/or associated states through 
a similar lens.10 The British exit provides additional impetus to understand the fu-
ture of European integration from this conceptual framework. Turkey already has a 
high degree of functional cooperation with the EU, which takes multiple forms in 
terms of economic, political, judicial and internal affairs, energy, and environmental 
cooperation.11 These forms of functional cooperation evolved because of Turkey’s 
association with the EU, its candidacy since 1999, and the accession negotiations 
since 2005—which enabled Turkey to adopt EU rules and policies without formal 
accession. Turkey’s adoption of EU rules and its integration in multiple technical 
6 Cemal Karakaş, “EU-Turkey: Integration without Full membership or Membership without Full integration: A 
Conceptual Framework for Accession Alternatives,”  Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (2013), pp. 
1057-73.
7 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey’s Future with the European Union: Alternative Modes of Differentiated 
Integration.” Turkish Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2017), pp. 416-439. 
8 Dirk Leuffen, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Berthold Rittberger. Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the 
European Union (London: Palgrave, 2012).
9 Katharina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Differentiated Integration in the European Union: Many Concepts, 
Sparse Theory, Few Data,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 19 (2012), pp. 292-30.
10 Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Models of External Differentiation in the EU’s Neighbourhood: An Expanding Economic 
Community?” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 6 (13 April 2015), pp. 854-870.
11 Müftüler-Baç, (2017) Karakaş, (2013). 
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areas indicate the scope of integration that transcends the EU’s own borders.12 This 
is also how EU integration influences a territorial space that is much broader than 
the sheer territory of the EU member states. This is precisely the key argument of 
this article: Even in the absence of full membership, Turkey will remain anchored 
to the EU, similar to the emerging British-EU dynamics or the European Economic 
Area countries such as Norway and Iceland. 
However, even for functional cooperation to continue, political factors matter. This 
article looks at the role of political factors in shaping Turkey’s relations with the EU 
and proposes that, given the current stalemate of the Turkish accession negotiations, 
the process could at least continue through deepening functional ties. This, however, 
needs to be noted with one caveat: The negotiations process has strengthened the 
hands of political reformers in Turkey and losing the EU anchor might be another 
nail in the coffin for Turkish democracy.13
The European Union’s Position towards Turkey 
It is not possible to analyze the EU’s official position and its member states’ views to-
wards Turkey’s accession independent of the political situation in Turkey. While the 
Commission’s Progress Report in 2004 indicated that “Turkey sufficiently fulfills the 
EU’s political criteria,” reforms in Turkey have slowed down. The aftermath of July 
15 constituted a watershed moment for Ankara’s ability to fulfill the EU’s political 
norms. In response, the EU immediately made declarations on the Turkish political 
situation. It prioritized the continuation of political reforms in Turkey and indicated 
that a significant lapse would derail the accession process. Turkey imposed a state 
of emergency after the July 2016 coup attempt and eliminated Gülenists, followers 
of the self-exiled imam Fethullah Gülen, from the country’s bureaucracy. A clear 
divergence between the EU and Turkey was the degree to which the Turkish political 
system confronted an existential threat. Turkish commentators noted the lack of un-
derstanding by EU officials to the dangers posed by Gülenists. When the European 
Parliament voted to suspend negotiations in November 2016 and on 6 July 2017, this 
was seen as further proof that the EU was clueless about political struggles in Turkey. 
The European Commission’s Progress Report released on 9 November 2016 stated 
that Turkey was backsliding and moving away from the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. 
This position was echoed in November 2016 in the informal meeting of the Foreign 
Affairs Council. EU member states discussed Turkey’s situation in the December 
12 Juha Jokela, “Multi-Speed Europe? Differentiated Integration in the External Relations of the European Union,” Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs Report, 38, 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177012/FIIA_Report38_web.pdf
13 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey’s Political Reforms: The Impact of the European Union,” Southeast European 
Politics and Societies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), pp. 16, 30. 
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2016 European Council meeting and decided to keep the accession process open. In 
July 2017, Johannes Hahn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Frederica 
Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Mevlüt Cavuşoğlu, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ömer Çelik, the 
Turkish Minister for EU Affairs met in Brussels to discuss the future of the relation-
ship. Hahn declared, “Ankara must reverse its trend toward authoritarianism before 
any progress could be made on Turkey’s entry bid,” whereas Mogherini pointed out 
the “worrying pattern of imprisonments of a large number of members of [Turkey’s] 
democratic opposition, journalists, and human rights defenders.”14 The Turkish gov-
ernment’s declared intention to reintroduce the death penalty into the Turkish Penal 
Code, which was lifted only in 2002 in order to meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, 
presented a particular problem. This reintroduction of the death penalty is against the 
premises of Article 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. If it is reintro-
duced, then Turkey’s relations with the EU as well as the Council of Europe would 
further deteriorate, with spillovers into Turkey’s relations with the EU. 
“Even in the absence of full membership, Turkey will remain 
anchored to the EU.”
This brings forth the question as to what instruments the EU has at its disposal 
to push Turkey back toward accession and, to a path of reform that falls short of 
stopping negotiations. The European Commission reevaluated Turkey’s progress 
towards fulfilling the EU’s accession criteria in its Annual Report released in April 
2018. The EU contemplated using financial tools—specifically the Instrument for 
Pre-Accession (IPA)—and stopping their flow into Turkey. However, the total freez-
ing of financial tools and instruments to Turkey is not possible, as it would require 
a freezing of the accession negotiations but portions of IPAs allocated for political 
reforms could be suspended, which was the step adopted in 2017. The European 
Commission spokesperson Mina Andreeva pointed out that if the EU “wanted to 
stop payments altogether that would require a decision by member states—namely, 
to freeze or stop accession talks with Turkey.”15 It must be noted that the suspension 
decision needs to be taken by a qualified majority of the members, as already stated 
in the 2005 Negotiations Framework for Turkey, with 16 members of the EU. Once 
they are suspended, to reinstate them would require unanimity, which would be al-
most impossible to attain again. This makes suspension a highly risky step to take.
14 “EU: No accession until Turkey halts authoritarian trend,” DW, 25 July 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/eu-no-
accession-until-turkey-halts-authoritarian-trend/a-39833346
15 Yunus Paksoy, “EC Spokesperson blocking funds to Turkey,” Daily Sabah, 6 August 2017, https://www.dailysabah.
com/eu-affairs/2017/08/07/ec-spokesperson-blocking-funds-to-turkey-requires-ending-of-accession-talks
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While the European institutions signaled their positions on the Turkish political sit-
uation and its possible impact on the future of Turkey’s accession process to the EU, 
diverging positions among member states—both in terms of how to continue the 
process as well as actions to be taken—became especially visible. 
Member States’ Divisions over Turkey
The European Union is characterized by consensus building among its member 
states when it comes to major policy decisions, and enlargement is one policy area 
where unanimity is required. Yet, member states are also often divided among them-
selves over the course of action towards Turkey. Given the multiple divergences 
among the member states, more powerful members end up gearing the direction to-
wards one particular end.16 Consensus building for EU policies towards Turkey has 
never been an easy process. Multiple member states have made this process difficult 
such as Germany under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, France under President Nicholas 
Sarkozy, or Greece and Cyprus which act as veto players and block the process al-
together or prevent the opening of chapters in the negotiations.
While Turkey’s relations with the EU experienced turbulent times, its bilateral rela-
tions with a number of countries—most importantly with Germany—took a nosedive. 
Since the end of 2016, the ongoing diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Germany 
has been taking a serious toll on Turkey's status as a candidate country. The German 
government became highly vocal about its opposition to Turkey’s EU accession in 
2017. Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic government has always been uneasy 
towards Turkey’s EU prospects, but they went along with the decisions of their pre-
decessor, the Social Democrats under Chancellor Gerard Schroeder. While the Social 
Democrats agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005, the Christian 
Democrats did not reverse the process after they came to power. However, since 2017, 
the majority of Germany’s political parties are in agreement over the Turkish issue. 
While it was largely the Christian Democrats in Germany that constituted the basis for 
this opposition, the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Germany resulted in Social 
Democrats joining the opposition camp. During the German election talks, the offi-
cial positions of Angela Merkel and her opponent from the Social Democratic Party, 
Martin Schultz, was that Turkey would not become a member of the European Union. 
When Merkel stated, “There cannot be a Turkish accession to the EU,” she merely 
echoed what most were feeling in Germany already.17
16 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998).
17 Bernd Riegert, “Can Merkel push the EU toward a new Turkey policy?” DW, 4 September 2017, http://www.dw.com/
en/can-merkel-push-the-eu-toward-a-new-turkey-policy/a-40360392
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“The Central and Eastern European, Baltic, and Mediterranean 
member states were not on board with Germany in terms of freezing 
or suspending negotiations with Turkey.”
Turkish-German relations had already been deteriorating over time. Turkey accused 
Germany of harboring the terrorists who staged the coup attempt in July 2016, and 
Germany was critical of the Turkish arrest of German nationals, which they claimed 
was taking place without due process. Finally, President Erdoğan claimed that the 
German position against Turkish accession is a position alike to “Nazi Germany.” 
This created further tension, as voiced by Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sigmar Gabriel: “That was just insulting.”18 Right before the German elections, 
Turkish President Erdoğan declared, “I call on them [Turks in Germany] not to vote 
for those parties who have been engaged in such aggressive, disrespectful attitudes 
against Turkey and I invite them to teach a lesson to those political parties at the 
ballot box.”19 Moreover Turkey prevented German parliamentarians from visiting 
German troops stationed in the İncirlik base in Adana, and in response, Germany 
warned its citizens from traveling to Turkey. Prior to this, a significant portion of 
tourists in Turkey came from Germany. Germany moved its troops and equipment 
from the Turkish İncirlik base to Jordan in July 2017, thereby downgrading its secu-
rity cooperation with Turkey. As Germany’s Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen 
stated, “Given that Turkey is currently not in a position to allow German parliamen-
tarians the right to visit İncirlik, the cabinet today agreed to move the Bundeswehr 
(armed forces) from İncirlik to Jordan.”20
Interestingly, while Germany became a staunch opponent to Turkey’s accession—
even calling for a freeze in negotiations, although not from its official capacity—the 
rest of the EU members were largely divided on this topic. In particular, the Central 
and Eastern European, Baltic, and Mediterranean member states were not on board 
with Germany in terms of freezing or suspending negotiations with Turkey. During 
the Gymnich meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers held in Tallinn 
in September 2017, the German position was met with skepticism, demonstrating 
that relations with Turkey constitute a fault line within the EU. It seems that uncer-
tainty over what kind of relations would emerge with Turkey in the case of such a 
18 Chloe Lyneham, “Sigmar Gabriel: ‘Turkey will never join EU’ under Erdoğan,” 25 August 2017, http://www.
dw.com/en/sigmar-gabriel-turkey-will-never-join-eu-under-erdogan/a-40236026
19 Claire Jones, “Writer’s Arrest adds Acrimony between Turkey and Germany,” Financial Times, 20 August 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/a48c4aec-859c-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7
20 Madeline Chambers, “Germany moves closer,” Reuters, 7 June 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-
turkey/germany-moves-closer-to-pulling-troops-from-turkey-base-idUSKBN18Y106
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suspension motivates the EU member states to keep the accession framework in 
place. Estonia’s Defense Minister Sven Mikser cautioned Germany: “All decisions 
about the future of EU-Turkey ties should be considered very carefully, and they 
should not be made during election campaigns.”21
“It remains to be seen what kind of model will emerge for  
Turkey-EU relations.”
Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn voiced a similar sentiment: “We 
have to be careful. We need to know where we will end up if we launch into a 
debate with Turkey over this sensitive topic. If we don’t know, I would advise cau-
tion… I have felt for a long time that we in the European Union are not at a point to 
end or freeze [the accession talks].”22  The German government’s proposal—while, 
again, not a formal one—to suspend accession negotiations was openly rejected by 
Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania, demonstrating that forming a unanimous position 
in the Council towards Turkey is difficult. Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Timo Soini argued, “We know that there are problems in Turkey when it comes to 
human rights… but I am not in favor of stopping negotiations, and the only way to 
work out the problems was through dialogue with Ankara.”23 Lithuania’s Foreign 
Minister Linas Linkevicius echoed the same sentiment: “By stopping, by cutting, 
we will not make a good thing because we will encourage them, even more, to go 
away. I think the effect would be the opposite than what we’d wish.”24 However, 
since the process cannot credibly proceed due to the political situation in Turkey, it 
remains to be seen what kind of model will emerge for Turkey-EU relations.
The 2005 Negotiations Framework for Turkey stated that in the case that negoti-
ation talks fail, then “Turkey would be tied to the EU with the strongest bonds.”25 
Of course, whether these “strongest bonds” constitute a form of external differenti-
ated integration needs further elaboration. External differentiated integration for a 
non-EU member such as Turkey might involve temporal alignment to EU policies 
21 “Estonian FM urges German politicians not to politicize Turkey-EU relations,” Daily Sabah, 6 September 2017, 
https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2017/09/06/estonian-fm-urges-german-politicians-not-to-politicize-turkey-eu-
relations
22 “EU brushes off Germany’s call to end Turkey membership talks,” DW, 8 September 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/
eu-brushes-off-germanys-call-to-end-turkey-membership-talks/a-40426216
23 “EU ministers push back on German calls to axe Turkey’s EU membership bid,” DW, 7 September 2017, http://www.
dw.com/en/eu-ministers-push-back-on-german-calls-to-axe-turkeys-eu-membership-bid/a-40399912
24 DW (2017).
25 “Negotiations Framework: Principles governing the Negotiations,” European Commission, 5 October 2005, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/september/tradedoc_135916.pdf
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and territorial inclusions—such as security cooperation, its Customs Union or visa 
rules for third parties and policy opt-ins such as the adoption of EU regulations in 
electricity, telecommunications, and education. These multiple layers of integration 
between Turkey and the EU keep their functional cooperation on track. 
“Multiple layers of integration between Turkey and the EU keep 
their functional cooperation on track.”
When the French President Emmanuel Macron declared that “he wished to avoid 
a rupture because [Turkey] is an essential partner in many crises we jointly face, 
specifically the migration challenge and the terrorist threat,” he was pointing out 
that despite the current political climate, Turkey plays an important role for the 
EU.26 It is not surprising that the importance of maintaining functional cooperation 
with Turkey has been an important theme in EU meetings since 2016. Multiple EU 
leaders vocalized similar sentiments. For example, Hungarian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Peter Szijjarto stated, “good relations with Ankara were essential for up-
holding the refugee deal. Whoever attacks the stability of Turkey would attack the 
security of Europe, because currently, Turkey is the one to halt the migratory flow 
to Europe.”27 Similarly, Estonian Foreign Minister Mikser made it clear that “come 
what may, Turkey would remain a crucial EU partner across a variety of policy 
fields… as the EU; we also have very significant trade ties with Turkey. Also, Turkey 
is a key player regarding the security situation in the region. In addition to that, it 
is one of our strongest and militarily best prepared NATO allies.”28 While some EU 
member states did not want to break all ties with Turkey, Austria was strongest in its 
opposition to the continuation of talks with Turkey. Sebastian Kutz, then Austria’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared: “There is a big difference between keeping up 
the dialogue on issues of common interest and pretending that a country will even-
tually be part of the European Union.”29 
These diverging preferences between the EU member states are, problematic for 
the EU’s international credibility. Angela Merkel pointed out this concern when she 
26 “EU divided over calls to block Turkey’s bid,” Hürriyet Daily News, 7 September 2017, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-divided-over-calls-to-block-turkeys bid.aspx?PageID=238&NID=117671&NewsCatID=351
27 “EU foreign ministers walk Turkey tightrope,” DW, 2 September 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/eu-foreign-ministers-
walk-turkey-tightrope/a-19524116
28 “EU ministers push back on German calls to axe Turkey’s EU membership bid,” DW, 7 September 2017, http://
www.dw.com/en/eu-ministers-push-back-on-german-calls-to-axe-turkeys-eu-membership-bid/a-40399912; “Estonian 
FM urges German politicians not to politicize Turkey-EU relations,” Daily Sabah, 6 September 2017, https://www.
dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2017/09/06/estonian-fm-urges-german-politicians-not-to-politicize-turkey-eu-relations
29 Florian Eder, “Austria to the EU: We need to talk Turkey,” Politico, 12 December 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/
austria-to-the-eu-we-need-to-talk-about-turkey-eu-membership-sebastian-kurz-austrias-foreign-minister/
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claimed: “Nothing would be more astonishing than if we in Europe publicly fall 
out over how to deal with Turkey. This would dramatically weaken the European 
position and I can only advise against this.”30  The EU seems to be caught in a place 
where suspending negotiations is not deemed desirable, but proceeding with further 
functional cooperation is also problematic as it might legitimize the current political 
impasse. 
Conclusion
In light of the current political situation in Turkey, its relations with the European 
Union within the accession framework have become increasingly complex. This 
does not, however, mean that the accession process has come to a full stop or that 
Turkey is out of the EU’s integration project. Instead, the EU is evolving into a 
multi-level, multi-layered polity with different degrees of integration not only with-
in its member states but also with non-member European countries. Brexit negotia-
tions with the EU indicate that different models of integration are being considered 
for the countries either unwilling or unfit for EU membership. Whether Turkey’s 
relations with the EU fit into that mode or not remains to be seen. What is almost 
certain is that Turkey is still tied to the EU in multiple ways, and the future of its 
relations with the EU is still being molded. 
While not all EU members would like to see the accession talks formally frozen 
with Turkey, this option remains on the table. Yet, to deepen functional cooperation 
with Turkey—and if so, how—is similarly perceived to be a politically adventurous 
question with the potential to harm the EU’s credibility. This is a primary dilemma 
for the EU: The question is how to reformulate Turkish-EU relations, on the one 
hand, and how to engage with Turkey to promote democratic transformation while 
positioning the EU as a credible promoter of democracy, on the other. 
30 Dimitra DeFotis, “Turkey ETF Slumps,” Barrons, 5 September 2017, http://www.barrons.com/articles/turkey-etf-
slumps-stay-out-of-europe-germany-says-1504629778
